[quote name='SeraphLance' timestamp='1311350785' post='4838983']
You're mistaken on the perception of free will. Free will is defined as a conscious decision, where you are free to choose what you decide. In a purely deterministic universe, you are not free to choose. It is already chosen. In a non-deterministic universe, you may or not be free to choose. For some reason, you're conflating free will with determinism.
It's you who are mistaken. If decisions brought about by "free will" are non-deterministic, then they're not
conscious decisions, at least not for any meaningful definition of "conscious" (e.g. existing within the mind). If I decide to, say, save someone's life with my "free will," then the fact that, if time were "rewound" to precisely the same state, I
might still make a different decision is not comforting in the least. In fact, it necessitates that my original decision was
not a conscious decision, nor, would I argue, is it a decision at all. Decisions are only meaningful if they have intentionality, that is, they are
about something. If they are non-deterministic, then by definition the actual decision itself stems from something not within the measurable universe.
The fact that "deterministic free will" also seems to be a contradiction merely suggests that "free will" itself is a logical absurdity.
[/quote]
I'm a little confused by your logic here. You're claiming that a decision that is not set in stone is not a decision at all. It seems to be the inverse of what most would claim. A decision that is made for you by a deterministic universe is not a decision, because you haven't
decided anything. Decisions do not exist without the free will for more than one choice to be possible. Otherwise there's no distinction between decisions and
events. At best, in a deterministic universe, you can claim a decision is something that gives off the illusion of free will.
I'm also confused by why you claim these decisions are not conscious. Why presume consciousness is naturally deterministic? I don't see where you've established that all conscious processes are known and controlled. That's certainly not a priori in the slightest, at least not in the scope of this argument.
Or, to put it another way: "Your" choices are necessarily either deterministic, or they are random*. In the latter case, they are in no sense your choices at all; you could just as easily say that they were the choices of the Random-God. If the choices "I" make are completely random, and independent of everything that I call me (specifically, my brain/mind) it's nonsensical to say that I am exercising my will to make them.
*that is, independent of every present, past, or future state in the observable universe
Where you imply random, I imply stochastic. There's an ocean of meaning between being completely arbitrary and being wholly dependent on known variables. You said it yourself, there are "hidden variables" that govern this behavior. However, "rewinding" does not allow us to fix these hidden variables into their prior state; that's why they're "hidden". If you can control these hidden variables, you're no longer modeling a non-deterministic universe.