Quote: Original post by alvaro
Just my personal opinion. Feel free to attack it. That's what forums are for. :)

Just to keep with the thread, I'm going to post a counter argument. Your beliefs are of course your own, and you are free to keep them.

This is simply a counter argument.

I have my own view, and this counter argument is not it.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
I am fairly familiar with Gödel's works, or at least I understood the proofs when I took the time to study them (my memory is a little bit fuzzy on some details now). I am also familiar with the notion of determinism. And I still don't see a connection between these things and intelligence or conciousness. I know some of these connections are made in "The emperor's new mind" by Roger Penrose, but I don't think his reasoning is sound.

First, you need to define conciousness.

I define it is the ability to make a choice between at least two options (aka Freedom model). That means you must have at least two options and (somehow) be able to take one or the other at your own free will.

If you were to (somehow) rewind the entire Universe to the instant before your choice, you could replay it and instead make a different choice. You might instead make a model of the Universe and test it instead.

You might have to rewind again and retry it hundreds, thousands, or a near infinite number of times, but the fact that there is a non-zero chance of a different choice is all it takes. Godel's and other's work says you can't do that test within the Universe, unless you accept nondeterminism and Freedom, and that their theories don't hold. Indeed, if you accept that, then no proofs are ever certain.

Your ability to make a choice means that the Universe is nondeterministic. Again by definition, you cannot absolutely determine or perfectly reproduce the future state of the Universe based on the previous state of the Universe.

If the future state does not follow from the prevoius state, then there is a non-zero probability that materials at any point in space or time may vary from the previous state, or lots of other weirdness. In Universal scope, non-zero probability means that you accept that it happens.

Therefore, the two base axioms of pure science are untrue: Given the same conditions, you get different results, and the Universe does not behave the same everywhere.

So your original question about the connection of the Freedom model involving Godel's work. The freedom model demands nondeterminism.

If it is deterministic, Godel's work says you can't prove Universal determinism. If it is nondeterministic, you cannot prove it within the scope of the Universe -- and under nondeterminism, proofs don't matter anyway. [wow]

(Did I cover everything?)

Quote: Original post by alvaro
I will explain my personal position. I honestly think that there is no such thing as free will in a strong sense. That doesn't mean that people don't make decissions. It just means that decission making falls within the laws of physiscs, like everything else.

I disagree, but that's a philosophical, moral, and/or spiritual question.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
The problem of conciousness is probably not a problem at all. I think the problem is with the way humans tend to think of the world. Most people have a description of the world that consists of some space populated by inanimate things and by living things. Both inanimate and living things are subject to the laws of physics, but living things have complicated behaviours that we don't fully grasp with our understanding of physiscs, so we imagine a "soul" or a "conciousness" attached to them, which is responsible for their behaviour.

Philosophical, moral, and/or spiritual questions.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
The question of whether a computer can have a conciousness is a human-centric questions, since "conciousness" is probably an artifact of human [poor] thinking, and not an element of reality.

Again, you need to get back to the definition of conciousness. If humans are capable of the Freedom model, then you need to define precisely what that model is, and you'll need to explain why other creatures, devices, machines, or other object cannot have conciousness.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
The answer is then that whenever a machine has a complicated enough behaviour, humans will treat it as having a conciousness, and that will be it.

That's psychology, philosophy, morals, and/or religion.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
Gödel and determinism have very little to do with conciousness.

Back to the definition of conciousness.

If a person is able to make a choice, then the Universe is nondeterministic by definition. The definition is back to Godel's work.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
Belief in souls or spirits might have more to do with it.

Again, that's the philosophical, moral, and/or relgious debate.



frob.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
I know some of these connections are made in "The emperor's new mind" by Roger Penrose, but I don't think his reasoning is sound.

Agreed.

My problem with the conclusion is that it assumed a 'level of precision' in a simulation. Maybe simulating / duplicating these things doesn't require quantum effect in order for the desired property to emerge.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
I honestly think that there is no such thing as free will in a strong sense. That doesn't mean that people don't make decissions. It just means that decission making falls within the laws of physiscs, like everything else.

Except that we can't every know the laws of phyisics-- they are unproveable. We can't know if the universe is deterministic or not. Laws are hardley laws when they don't obey themselfs by randomly deciding to do things. :)

Quote: Original post by alvaro
so we imagine a "soul" or a "conciousness" attached to them, which is responsible for their behaviour.

It's not imagined. I can't prove this but you are aware of yourself, which you know, so it's not imagined.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
The question of whether a computer can have a conciousness is a human-centric questions, since "conciousness" is probably an artifact of human [poor] thinking, and not an element of reality.

I disagree. There is likely some process, some thing, that _is_ conciousness. The 'I' or presistance of self. If it can be simulated, or duplicated (which we know it can, vis-a-vis child birth), then it may be possible to give a non-human entity the same property.

Quote: Original post by alvaro
The answer is then that whenever a machine has a complicated enough behaviour, humans will treat it as having a conciousness, and that will be it. Gödel and determinism have very little to do with conciousness.

Just because something looks like it's concious doesn't make it so. Fooling people and actually _being_ are two different things. Fake ducks (decoys) are not ducks.

Let me ask you this: If I could somehow make a copy of you as you are now, would I have one or two separate concious entities? If I killed the original, would that original continue to exist as a concious entity by way of the second, or would he move on in to the afterlife (oblivion, or heaven, whatever your beliefs dictate).

Quote: Original post by alvaro
Belief in souls or spirits might have more to do with it.

Who knows!? I sure as heck don't.

Will

Regarding RPGeezus's point of duplicating a person:

Imagine a Star Trek like machine that can teleport you from A to B. Imagine it malfunctions and duplicates you.

Now, I've heard the above situation in various counciousness and sentient discussions, but what many people seem not to know, or to forget, is that since we're born, a huge percentage of our body gets recicled.

I don't know the exact percentage, but in a decade I would guestimate that above 98% of our body is eliminated by natural processes (food is converted into new cell structures, and old structures are eliminated from the body via urine or fecal mater).

So, how much "me" is there in me after a 10 year lifespan?

I'm also aware that some of our cells can remain on the body for a very long time with little deterioration. This seems to be truer in nervous cells, and neurons especially seem to be pretty resilient (well, the cranium is especially designed to be an organic "clean lab", so to speak, in that every little detail, like bloodflow, oxygenation, temperature, even sudden movements are taken into account and minimized).

None the less I'm 27 now, and I still "feel" like me. It seems there is no need for a super high-tech machine from the future to test out the theory of counsciousness then. Parts of "me" can change, will change, and "me" will still feel like "me", if the changes are slow enough for "me" to adapt.

Just wanted to bring this point up.

Quote: Original post by frob
Since it's been proven to be an undecidable problem, it will have to be a philosophical proof.

I'm comfortable enough with the problem that whichever way you argue, I'll argue against it. [disturbed]

frob.

Ok, I will accept your challenge. Here is a sketch of my proof of non-nondeterminism:



I will assume that I live in a world of complete freedom (and that the statement F "I am completely free" holds true by definition).

But, if F holds true, and I am completely free, I am also free to imagine a world in which I am unfree (if I would not be allowed to do that, I would not be completely free).

Even more, if I am completely free, I am free to state that I have always lived in such a world (and that the statement U "I have never been free" holds true).

Therefore F implies U.

But the statement U ("I am not free") is in contradiction with the statement F ("I am free").

This contradiction implies that the original premise F can not be true.

But if the statement F is not true, then the statement U (which says that I live in a world without freedom) must be true.

[Edited by - Devilogic on December 7, 2005 3:14:14 PM]

Quote: Original post by Prozak
Regarding RPGeezus's point of duplicating a person:

Imagine a Star Trek like machine that can teleport you from A to B. Imagine it malfunctions and duplicates you.

I'd never step in to one of those crazy things. I say they're suicide machines. :)

Quote: Original post by Prozak
but what many people seem not to know, or to forget, is that since we're born, a huge percentage of our body gets recicled.
.
.
.

You're not all getting recycled at the same time. You're body doesn't instantly decay only to regrow again.

Pieces come and go all fizzy like, not in big chunks.

Maybe over a 10 year span you have changed all of your parts, but it was gradual.

I'm not trying to play down the implications of what you are saying. :) I think this is an important clue about the nature of conciousness.

Quote: Original post by Prozak
None the less I'm 27 now, and I still "feel" like me..

We're the same age and I still feel like me too, most of the time. ;)

A friend of mine believes that he's not the same person, that his self from 10 seconds ago is gone to oblivion. He thinks persistance of conciousness is an illusion. I don't believe this though, and I have a small thought experiment for it.


Imagine that you are only you for 10 seconds at a time. After 10 seconds you have changed enough that you're a different person, a different conciousness. The interval of time maybe irrelevant, I'm just picking 10 for illustrative purposes.

During the course of a minute, an outside observer will see only one you, but in reality, 6 separate conciousness's have come and gone.

Here is where I get metaphysical, but it's only for illustrative purposes.

Lets assume there is an after life-- not heaven, but a celestial zoo. In the afterlife you conciousness continues unbroken, taking in the sights at the zoo.

At my zoo there are six exhibits, and when you enter the zoo the zoo-keeper sends you to one of the exhibits based on the order in which you came. The first person in sees the monkeys, the second the tigers, the third the elephants, the fourth sees Flamingos, etc...

Mr. Entity sits down in front of the TV and begins conversing with his wife..

10 seconds in, *BOOM*, conciousness two takes over-- he feels like his conciousness 1, since he has all of the memories, etc... Conciousness one on the other hand finds himself strangley looking at monkeys, wondering where his wife went.

20 seconds in to life, conciousness two suddenly finds himself staring at tigers, and conciousness three is continuing a converstation with a woman he believes is his wife.

30 seconds, then 40, 50, 60.. You get the point.

Now, if you really are a different conciousness, and not the same conciousness over the course of your life, at some point in time you would find yourself sitting at the zoo! You can't be _all_ of the different conciousnesses-- you have your turn, and then it's zoo time. Being them all would be saying that there is something persistant.

Replace the zoo with heaven, or oblivion. It wont matter. Either way, you still can only be one of them. If you only persist for 50 miliseconds and oblivion is your fate, then thats were you'll be.

It IS possible that _I_ just happen to be taking my turn at bat right now, but, eventually it will have to come to an end putting me somewhere else (with or without a conciousness).

Since I'm not sitting at the zoo right now, I'm not having fun in heaven (or hell), and I'm definately not in oblivion, I find it rather hard to conclude that I'm a different conciouness this week from the one last week.

I believe that there is something persistant... at least persistant enough from one moment to the next to allow me to be the same conciousness through the course of my life.


-Will

Quote: Original post by Devilogic
Ok, I will accept your challenge. Here is a sketch of my proof of non-nondeterminism:

I will assume that I live in a world of complete freedom (and that the statement F "I am completely free" holds true by definition).

But, if F holds true, and I am completely free, I am also free to imagine a world in which I am unfree (if I would not be allowed to do that, I would not be completely free).

Even more, if I am completely free, I am free to state that I have always lived in such a world (and that the statement U "I have never been free" holds true).

Therefore F implies U.

But the statement U ("I am not free") is in contradiction with the statement F ("I am free").

This contradiction implies that the original premise F can not be true.

But if the statement F is not true, then the statement U (which says that I live in a world without freedom) must be true.

I disagree with your falicious logic, but that doesn't matter. [grin]

It's easy to claim that the Universe is nondeterministic. And if you claim it, you actually don't need proof.

Since it can't be decided either way, then it's an acceptable option.

In the process, you must also accept that the basic axioms of pure science are flawed, and that there is a possibility of weird stuff happening that doesn't follow from the state before. That's the point I was making at first with the nondeterminism argument, and the result of Godel's work, and the work of several people who came after him.

If you accept nondeterminism, you also accept that solid proofs may be violated by the Universe. I've worked with several hard-core scientists who similarly believed this. It doesn't mean that all proofs are invalid all the time, only that all proofs may be violated (by Chance or Freedom).

I already provided a counter argument for this above, so I'm not going to pick yours apart just for the mental exercise.


Nobody has presented the argument of "We have no Freedom, but Chance makes the Universe nondeterministic." I look forward to seeing that one.

frob.

Quote: Original post by Devilogic
I will assume that I live in a world of complete freedom (and that the statement F "I am completely free" holds true by definition).

But, if F holds true, and I am completely free, I am also free to imagine a world in which I am unfree (if I would not be allowed to do that, I would not be completely free).
.
.


Therefore F implies U.

That doesnt make any sense to me.

This sounds similar to arguments about 'all-powerful' beings (unstoppable object hits an unmoveable object), except that in this case you are just saying things without the ability to actualize them.

i.e. you can state that you are not free, but it does not make you any less free.


Will

Indeed my logic is flawed. But my logic needn't be perfect to begin with, since even with perfect logic nothing could actually be proven here (when talking about philosophical questions) :)


About actualizing things.. if I were trouly free I wouldn't have to choose from a defined set of options - if I were trouly free I could define my own set of options (a bit extreme, I know).

A quick example: imagine you are being locked up in a jail somewhere. You have the freedom to choose between sleeping, thinking, etc., but you can't choose to leave. Can you really say that you are free?

Anyway, if I were trouly free, then I could choose to simply abandon my world/reality/whatever, and define my own reality (define my own options to choose from). If I could do that, then I *could* choose to live in any world I wanted to; be it nondeterministic or not..


I hope that clears things up a bit, but as I said: philosophy is all about using quasi-logic to mislead someone to belive that there is actually an answer where non exists. ;)

Quote: Original post by Devilogic
A quick example: imagine you are being locked up in a jail somewhere. You have the freedom to choose between sleeping, thinking, etc., but you can't choose to leave. Can you really say that you are free?

Under the Freedom model? You are free to choose the action to take, and manipulate the Universe in any way you are able to.

Under the Chance model? You might get really lucky and have the Infinite Improbability Drive turn your prison wall into a turnip and the guards into petunias. And you might get out, again depending on Chance.

Under the Fatalistic model? It doesn't matter.


[embarrass]

frob.

There will never be "REAL" AI.